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The Birth Dearth, Aging, 
and the Economy
Where Have We Been and Where Are We Going?
Richard A. Easterlm 
University of Southern California
In his recent volume, The Birth Dearth, Benjamin Wattenberg sees 
the American economy, fettered by low fertility and an aging popula 
tion, as grinding to a virtual halt over the next century. Wattenberg 
writes for a popular audience in a self-styled "speculative and provoca 
tive" fashion. But his work forms the tip of a substantial iceberg of 
recent scholarly opinion offering similar and even wider-ranging argu 
ments about the longer-term economic prospects of the United States 
and other advanced industrial economies. In a nutshell, recent low 
rates of childbearing, "the birth dearth," by causing low or negative 
population growth and population aging, are seen as exerting a serious 
drag on the economy. This happens because of slower growth of mar 
kets, decreased productivity growth, and an increased burden of depen 
dency.
These arguments are typically long on speculation but short on 
facts, especially with regard to history. I propose here to offer a correc 
tive. First, I recapitulate briefly the theoretical arguments and note 
some counterarguments that have been advanced. Then I turn to the 
historical facts and assess the arguments in the light of actual experi 
ence, both that of the United States and of advanced western and north 
ern European countries. If population growth plays such an important 
role in determining economic growth, then one would expect to find 
that population growth and economic growth go together. Is this, in 
fact, the case? And how do prospective rates of population growth 
compare with past experience are they, for example, far lower than 
what has gone before? What of the outlook for the dependency bur 
den? Does this involve magnitudes that appear unprecedented? How
ll
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has economic growth varied with the dependency burden in the past? 
How serious is the prospective aging of the labor supply, as distinct 
from population? What are the implications of aging for the educa 
tional attainment of the labor supply?
In discussing these questions, I take as given (as do Wattenberg and 
others) the current projections of population stagnation here and 
abroad. Typically these projections come in three variants high, mid 
dle, and low with the middle projection being most favored. But even 
the high-fertility projection assumes only a modest eventual increase in 
rates of childbearing, to an average of around 2.1 births per woman. 
This magnitude of 2.1 is called replacement-level fertility, because it is 
the rate of childbearing per woman needed to maintain population size 
constant over the long run.
These projections whether low, middle, or high of future low 
fertility are critical to the forecasts of stagnating population and rising 
old-age dependency. But how much confidence can we place in projec 
tions that seek to peer a half century or more into the future? Does the 
history of population forecasting, and particularly of projections of 
rates of childbearing, argue for accepting these forecasts? If not, would 
alternative forecasts substantially alter the outlook for population 
aging? In the concluding section, I address these questions in short, 
the prospective continuation of the "birth dearth" itself.
Effects of Population on the Economy: Theoretical Arguments
The theoretical arguments are of two general types one relating to 
the impact of population change on the demand for goods, the other 
relating to the impact on the supply or production capabilities of the 
economy (for specific references, see Easterlin 1991).
The demand argument focuses on the effect of a declining rate of 
population growth. The growth rate of population, it is said, governs 
the growth rate of markets, and thus of the demand for consumer goods 
and also capital goods such as housing, factories, and machinery. 
Declining population growth discourages business, causing markets to 
expand less rapidly or cease to grow altogether.
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The arguments about supply-side effects stress the impact of popu 
lation aging. The population is seen as comprising three parts young, 
middle-aged, and older with the older segment growing relative to 
the other two. Now assume that for any given attribute affecting pro 
duction capabilities, say, physical strength, the older group is relatively 
low. Other things being constant, if the elderly's share of the popula 
tion grows, then the average degree of physical strength in the popula 
tion as a whole will decline. Aging of the population would thus reduce 
production capacity by lowering the physical capacity of the popula 
tion.
The specific attributes to which this argument is applied are numer 
ous. The older population is supposed to be less well educated, and 
thus less skilled. The older population is assumed to be less likely to 
save and thereby to finance capital accumulation. The older population 
is said to be more fixed in its ways, less innovative and creative, and 
thus an obstacle to technological progress. The older population is 
claimed to be less geographically and occupationally mobile, and 
therefore less able to take advantage of new opportunities essential to 
economic progress. In combination, these arguments assert that, in 
general, aging of the population will retard the growth of production 
capabilities by lowering the quality of the labor supply, reducing the 
rate of capital accumulation, and lessening the rate of technical 
progress.
In addition, the older population is said to be different in the type of 
dependency burden it presents. Per capita public expenditures on 
retirement and health are greater for the older population. Hence, as the 
proportion of elderly grows, so too will the proportion of taxes to 
income needed to finance public retirement and health spending. Thus 
the "burden of old-age dependency" raises the specter of an insupport 
able tax burden on the working-age population, lowering the motiva 
tion of workers to work and save.
Although this is a formidable set of arguments, it has not gone with 
out challenge. Regarding the demand argument, it is pointed out that 
markets depend on total spending, not number of spenders. Even with 
the number of spenders constant, spending per person and thus total 
spending will continue to rise as per capita income grows. On the sup 
ply side, it is pointed out that arguments about physical strength are of 
dubious relevance to a labor force dominated by white-collar and ser-
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vice workers. Whether older workers are less educated depends on the 
historical nature of educational progress. Moreover, age stands for 
experience, and an older labor force is a more experienced labor force. 
Nor is it clear that the older population saves less; older persons, it is 
said, may be hesitant to spend down their assets because of uncertainty 
about health costs and the timing of death, as well as the desire to leave 
an inheritance.
As always, such "on the one hand," "on the other" arguments leave 
one in a sea of uncertainty. Hence the need for historical facts, to which 
we now turn.
The Evidence
As we examine the facts, we look at the United States and at ten 
European nations in the forefront of the demographic changes that 
have caused concern. The population projections used are the same as 
those underlying the present gloomy forecasts of long-term economic 
stagnation.
What Has Been the Historical Relation Between 
Population Growth and Economic Growth?
If population growth were a major factor influencing economic 
growth, then one might expect to find that higher population growth 
and higher economic growth go together. Is this, in fact, the case?
Figure 1 presents growth rates since 1870 of population and real per 
capita income for each of the eleven countries. Average growth rates 
over four long periods are given. The periods are those identified by 
Angus Maddison in his book, Phases of Capitalist Development 
(1982), as development "phases" common to these countries, except 
that the most recent period in his study, 1973-1979, has been updated 
to cover 1973-1986.
Studying the figure, one notes that fluctuations in the two series go 
together in most countries. Conceivably, one might seize on this to 
argue that declines in population growth cause declines in per capita 
income growth, but this is to argue that the tail wags the dog. Note that
15
Figure 1. Rate of Growth of GDP Per Capita (solid line) and
Population (dotted line), Specificed Country and Period 
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in all countries the swings in population growth rates are quite small 
compared with those in per capita income growth.
Even more doubt about the importance of population growth in 
determining economic growth arises when one compares long-term 
trends in the two series. While population growth has trended down 
ward in most of these countries over the last century, real per capita 
income growth has trended upward. Typically the two post-1950 
observations on real GDP per capita in figure 1, including even that for 
the recent relatively depressed period, 1973-1986, lie above those for 
the two earlier periods. In contrast, the post-1950 rates of population 
growth are about the same as or lower than the pre-1950 rates. This 
inverse association between trends in economic growth and population 
growth is contrary to what one would have expected if declining popu 
lation growth were exerting a serious drag on the economy.
How Sizable are Projected Declines in Population Growth 
Compared With Past Experience?
The population growth rates projected for these countries in the next 
century are, in fact, not a great deal different from their current rates. 
The average annual growth rate of population in 1973-1986 was only 
0.3 percent; the projected growth rate, at its lowest for the period 
2030-2050 averages -0.3 percent (United Nations 1988b). The pro 
spective decline in population growth rates is thus, on average, 0.6 per 
centage points over an interval of six decades, or a tenth of a 
percentage point per decade. As we have just seen, per capita income 
growth has trended upward in these countries, while population growth 
has trended downward. It is hard to believe that such a modest further 
decline in the rate of population growth would in itself produce a dra 
matic adverse departure from the historic pattern of secularly rising per 
capita income growth.
How Sizable Are Projected Increases in the Overall 
Dependency Burden Compared With Past Experience?
The dependency burden is sometimes discussed as though it com 
prises elderly dependents alone, but it is obvious that the burden of 
dependency on the working-age population involves infants and chil-
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dren as well as older dependents. Thus, to put dependency changes in 
proper perspective, one needs to look at the size of the entire depen 
dent population, young and old, relative to the working age population. 
To this end, figure 2 presents, for the same eleven countries since 1880, 
the ratio to the working age population aged 15-64 of the sum of the 
two dependent age groups, persons under age 15 and over age 64. Sub 
sequently, we will consider the two age groups separately. The vertical 
broken line in each panel is at 1990, separating actual experience from 
projected. The horizontal line in each panel, about which most of the 
curves fluctuate, is at a value of 0.6, indicating that, on average in this 
period, there were about 0.6 dependents per member of the working- 
age population.
How sizable is the prospective increase in dependency when viewed 
in historical perspective? Figure 2 shows a projected peak in depen 
dency for all of the countries in 2040, half a century hence. How does 
the height of this peak compare with the highest level reached in the 
past century? In three countries (France, Germany, and Switzerland) 
the projected peak is clearly higher; in three others (Norway, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States), clearly lower; and in the rest, 
it is about the same. On average, the total dependency rate in these 
advanced industrial countries will about match its historic high in the 
period since 1880. The projected levels in 2040 are clearly higher than 
those prevailing at the current time, and it is this contrast that gives rise 
to much of the current concern. But extending the period of compari 
son backward a full century, one finds that in only three of the coun 
tries is projected dependency higher than in the past. Moreover, in no 
case does the projected high fall outside of the past century's experi 
ence of these countries taken as a whole the highest projected ratios 
are somewhat less than 0.8, as was true of the highest ratios in the late 
nineteenth century.
Thus, the outlook for the total dependency burden, when viewed 
against the experience of the past century, is not unprecedented. This 
conclusion holds under a variety of sensitivity tests. Varying the con 
cept of dependency for example, instead of population ratios, using 
nonworkers to workers does not alter the picture. Nor does focusing 
on the "highly" dependent population, that is, old-old plus young- 
young. Neither do changes in the source used for the projections  
OECD, UN, IMF, etc. Nor does allowance for wide variation in immi-
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Figure 2. Total Dependency Ratio, Actual and Projected, Specified
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gration. Among current projections, the only case in which total depen 
dency would rise to levels unprecedented in the past century is that 
which assumes a mortality revolution at the oldest ages. Although this 
possibility cannot be wholly ruled out, it is not this projection that 
underlies current gloomy accounts of the economic impact of popula 
tion aging. Rather, such accounts are based on the more moderate mor 
tality projections on which the projections used in figure 2 are based.
What Has Been the Historical Relation Between the
Dependency Burden and the Rate of Economic Growth?
Figure 3 bears on the relation between the dependency burden and 
the rate of economic growth. It is designed to assess whether increases 
in the dependency rate have been associated with decreases in the rate 
of economic growth. The four time periods used in figure 1 are again 
used here, 1870-1913 through 1973-1986.
As can be seen, although growth of total output (GDP) per capita 
(the solid line) has varied markedly from one period of economic 
growth to another, the total dependency rate (the dotted line) has not. 
In most of the countries, the dependency rate is highest in the period 
1870-1913, thereafter it is fairly stable (figure 3). In the post-World 
War II period the contrast is dramatic. Growth rates of real per capita 
income in the period 1950-1973 were almost double those from 1973 
to 1986, averaging 3.5 versus 1.9 percent. In contrast, in almost all of 
the countries, the dependency rate was nearly the same in the two peri 
ods, and the eleven-country average was, in fact, virtually identical, .55 
versus .54. One would be hard put to argue that dependency had much 
to do with the dramatic post-1973 drop in economic growth rates, and 
not surprisingly, it is never mentioned in scholarly attempts to explain 
this decline.
What Does the Prospective Rise in Old-Age Dependency Imply 
for the Tax Burden on the Working-Age Population?
Although overall dependency will not be so much different, the pro 
spective age composition of dependency will be. As shown in figure 4, 
youth dependency is trending downward and old-age dependency 
upward. Seen in conjunction with the total dependency trend, this shift
20
Figure 3. Rate of Growth of GDP Per Capita (solid line, right scale) and 
Average Total Dependency Ratio (dotted line, left scale), 
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Figure 4. Youth and Elderly Dependency Ratio, Specified Country,
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puts in a rather different light the issue of the prospective burden on the 
working population of rising old-age dependency. Clearly, a declining 
burden of young dependents compensates for a growing burden of 
older dependents. Analysts of government spending sometimes recog 
nize this by noting the offset to rising government retirement and 
health spending provided by declining education expenditures (Holz- 
mann 1988; OECD 1988). But the relevant comparison must go 
beyond this to consider the full economic costs per dependent, that is, 
the private as well as public costs of supporting infants and children 
compared with the elderly. If the working-age population needs to 
spend less out of its income to support children, then more funds are 
potentially available for supporting older dependents (United Nations 
1988a).
It is one thing to count heads and compare the number of younger 
versus older dependents. It is another to assess the full economic costs 
of supporting an average younger versus older dependent. Clearly, the 
standard of support for both children and older dependents is socially, 
not physiologically, determined. Moreover, there is the need to con 
sider nonmarket production and consumption of the two groups. 
Indeed, it is because of the ambiguity regarding costs of dependents 
that it is important to have a clear picture of the numbers of younger 
versus older dependents, as in figure 4.
The amount of empirical work that has actually been done on rela 
tive costs of the two groups is small, but what has been done suggests 
that economic costs per dependent (private plus public) are, in fact, not 
much different for older and younger dependents (Easterlin 1991). If 
this is so, then the economic burden of dependency on the working-age 
population is unlikely to be noticeably higher in the first half of the 
twenty-first century than in the twentieth century, since the increased 
cost of supporting a larger proportion of older dependents will be offset 
by the decreased cost of supporting a smaller proportion of younger 
dependents. This implies that the real issue to be faced is largely politi 
cal, namely, how to capture via taxation the savings of households 
from supporting fewer younger dependents, so that these funds can be 
used to meet the rise in public expenditures needed to support older 
dependents. The question of political feasibility is a serious one, but it 
does not seem insurmountable, given that the workers to be taxed 
would themselves eventually be beneficiaries of such taxation. In any
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event, the issue is clearly different from that suggested by the view that 
the prospective economic burden on workers of support of dependents 
will somehow be unprecedented. This does not seem to be the case.
But what about the implications for the prospective tax burden on 
the working-age population? Clearly, if public expenditures grow rela 
tive to GNP over the long run, so too will taxes. For one thing, as was 
noted, increased public spending on retirement and health care would 
be partly offset by decreased public spending for schooling. Hence, the 
net increase in public spending and thus in taxes would be less than the 
increase in retirement and health spending. Moreover, as shown in 
table 1, projections to 2040 by OECD for most of the countries cov 
ered here, using the present demographic scenario, indicate that a quite 
modest average annual growth rate of real earnings (between 0.3 to 0.8 
percent) would suffice to keep the tax burden per head of the working- 
age population in 2040 at the same level as in 1980. This growth rate of 
earnings is well below that experienced in the past. This projection 
assumes no change in benefit levels for the older population, but it also 
fails to allow for the fact that the taxable capacity of the working-age 
population would be enhanced by fewer younger dependents per 
worker and by higher labor force participation of females. Nor is there 
any allowance for a possible "peace dividend" due to the end of the 
cold war. Thus, it seems unlikely that there would be adverse incentive 
effects because of an undue tax burden associated with population 
aging.
How Sizable is the Prospective Aging of the Labor Supply, 
and What Does It Imply for the Overall Educational 
Level of the Labor Supply?
What is the outlook for the age composition of the working-age 
population itself? Will there be, as some have argued, a disproportion 
ate number of older workers and a consequent possible decline in inno 
vation, mobility, and thus productivity growth? To assess this question, 
figure 5 presents data from 1880 through 2025 for the ratio of the pop 
ulation aged 20-34 to that aged 35-64, that is, the younger working- 
age population relative to the older. The trend in this ratio is clearly 
downward; there will be relatively fewer younger and more older 
workers. In most countries, however, the projected level around 2025
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is not much below that around 1960. World Bank projections (Bulatao 
et al. 1990), which have ratios for 2025 much like those shown here, 
imply an increase to 2050 in the proportion of the young in all of the 
countries, ranging from 2 to 10 percentage points, as lower birth rate 
cohorts replace higher birth rate cohorts at ages 35-64. Thus, while a 
relative scarcity of younger workers (or surplus of older workers) is in 
prospect for the first quarter of the next century, it is not greatly out of 
line with the degree of scarcity experienced three decades ago, and it is 
projected to lessen between 2025 and 2050.
Table 1. Average Annual Growth Rate of Real Earnings Per Worker 
Required to Maintain Tax Burden Per Worker Constant, 1980-2040, and 
Actual Growth Rate of Earnings, Eight Countries, 1965-1987 
(percent per year)
(I)(2)


























SOURCES Column 1. Calculated from OECD (1988, p 41). The OECD projection is based on 
the demographic projections underlying figure 2 and an assumption of constant age-sex specific 
labor force participation rates. Column 2. Compensation per employee in the business sector as 
reported in OECD (1990), adjusted by the consumer pnce index (OECD, various dates). The 
period used for the actual growth rates is the longest for which historical OECD data are avail 
able, United States data are since 1948. 
a.1970-1987 
b 1948-1987
What about the impact of labor supply aging on the educational 
attainment of the labor force? In considering this, one should note that 
in a number of these countries, the educational level of the older work 
ing-age population will improve substantially over the next thirty 
years, as those who benefited from the pre-1970s upsurge of schooling
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reach older ages. Table 2 shows the prospective changes in educational 
attainment of older workers implied by recent census data. If schooling 
of the young continues to stagnate as it did in the 1970s (OECD 1983, 
1984), the average level of education of the labor force as a whole 
would, nonetheless, be higher, as less-educated older cohorts are 
replaced by better-educated ones. If schooling of the young resumes its 
prior uptrend, then the average education of the labor force will rise 
even more. In either event, the favorable trend in educational attain 
ment at older ages will offset the supposed adverse effect of aging on 
education of the labor supply.
Table 2. Actual and Projected Percentage of Those Aged 55-64 

























SOURCES United Nations (1974, 1980), U S Bureau of the Census (1984, 1987).
a The age group for Denmark and Norway is 45-64, for Sweden, 55 and over. For Sweden, the
percentage is for those with some secondary level education or higher.
There is a tendency to think of the older population in terms of the 
low educational levels that prevailed in the past. It is time to recognize 
that in many countries older workers will be much better educated than 
heretofore, and not much different in educational level from younger 
workers. In the future the generally higher educational level of older 
workers (and possible younger workers as well) should be an impor 
tant factor, along with the greater experience of older workers, com 
pensating for a negative effect, if any, of aging on innovation and 
mobility.
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The Outlook for the Birth Dearth
So far the analysis has accepted without question the view embod 
ied in current population projections that fertility will remain quite low, 
perhaps declining further or rising to near-replacement levels at most. 
But how good are these projections? To answer this, one might reason 
ably ask: did population forecasters foresee either the enormous post- 
World War II baby boom or subsequent baby bust? The answer is no. 
While the baby boom was taking off in the late 1940s, population fore 
casters were still predicting a continuation of the low fertility rates of 
the 1930s. Eventually, in the 1950s, with the baby boom at full throttle, 
forecasters abandoned their low fertility projections for high fertility 
forecasts only to be caught by surprise once again as fertility started to 
plunge in the 1960s. In the last two decades, as fertility rates plum 
meted to new lows in advanced industrial countries, forecasters have 
switched back to low fertility assumptions, as in the forecasts we have 
just been examining.
How much faith can we put in the current projections? Not much. 
Rather than predicting the future, fertility projections basically track 
the recent past. Instead of admitting this, however, forecasters typically 
try to buttress their projections with supporting judgments. The latest 
United States Census Bureau high fertility projection foresees an even 
tual rate of childbearing only slightly above replacement, about 2.2 
births per woman. In commenting on this, the Bureau assures us: "it is 
clearly possible that fertility might eventually surpass [this level]...but 
that does not seem likely given the social, economic, and demographic 
trends of the last two decades" (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1989, p. 
21). Similarly, in a recent volume, authoritatively entitled Future 
Demographic Trends in Europe and North America, the United 
Nations' 1988 high projection of the total fertility rate (which also 
reaches an eventual mean value of about 2.2 for industrialized coun 
tries) is dismissed as "too high and not very probable." Instead, the 
author opts for fertility rates considerably below replacement levels as 
more probable, an average of about 1.6 to 1.9 births per woman 
(Klingerl991,p. 159).
Such statements have a familiar ring. Over four decades ago, in 
1948, the then leading American scholarly demographic publication
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opined regarding future fertility rates that "...the range of uncertainty 
is between rates somewhat below replacement and rates slightly above 
such replacement" (Population Index 1948). Needless to say, this state 
ment was made after the post-World War II American baby boom was 
underway, when fertility soared far above replacement levels.
A similar fate may be in store for the more recent statements quoted 
above. As shown in table 3, in a number of advanced industrial econo 
mies, the total fertility rate in 1990 was noticeably above its 1980s 
trough, and in none was it below. The U.S. Census Bureau's high pro 
jection of total births in 1990, published in 1989, was over 5 percent 
below actual experience. Even allowing for the fact that work on the 
projection was completed in 1987, how could the high projection fall 
so far short in only three years? Indeed, although the latest recession 
has put the usual damper on fertility, total births in 1991 were again 
above the high projection of the Census Bureau, by almost 4 percent. 
Compared with the medium projection, that used in the forecasts here, 
births in 1990 and 1991 averaged almost 12 percent higher than pro 
jected.
Table 3. Current Total Fertility Rate (TFR) Compared With That at 
Most Recent "Baby Bust" Trough, Twelve Countries, 1980-Present
Baby bust trough Current (preliminary) Percent
change in 









































































SOURCES- Calot (1988); Van de Kaa (1988), Monmer (1990); Monnier and Guibert-Lantoine 
(1991, p. 955).
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Clearly, the fertility experience of the past few years here and 
abroad hints at the possibility of a new fertility upswing. Historical 
experience does provide a basis for projecting an upturn in fertility. If 
we extend our historical perspective beyond the past two decades, we 
find that over the past century there has been a long-term swing in fer 
tility rates in almost all advanced industrial countries. This is illus 
trated by estimates of completed fertility presented in table 4. 
Typically, the initial trough occurs among women born near the begin 
ning of the century and the subsequent peak among those born in the 
early 1930s. Although completed fertility for most women born in the 
two decades after World War II is not yet exactly known, the projected 
figures for women born in 1950, who are now very close to the end of 
their childbearing, are very similar to those of the cohorts born at the 
beginning of the century. A new upswing would extend this pattern 
nicely. Although the historical record does not prove that fertility will 
increase as in the past, recent experience hints at this. Certainly, the 
historical record suggests that an increase in fertility is a possibility 
that forecasters ought at least to recognize.
This possibility finds further support when we consider the prospec 
tive labor market for young adults in the coming decade. The numbers 
of those who will be reaching the childbearing ages will be unusually 
low, an echo of the recent baby bust. Also, immigration from low- 
income countries in Europe is likely to be increasingly restricted. Other 
things constant, this scarcity of younger workers will make for a favor 
able labor market for adults in the family formation ages, a reversal of 
the situation experienced by their predecessors, the baby boom 
cohorts. The biggest conjectural factor is the growth rate of aggregate 
demand. The prospective reduction in military outlays and consequent 
easing of spending pressures on government budgets give some basis 
for thinking there may be a return to the expansive monetary-fiscal pol 
icies of the earlier post-World War II era. Moreover, smaller numbers 
at the younger end of the labor market should make for more vigorous 
expansion of aggregate demand by the monetary-fiscal authorities by 
lowering the unemployment rate corresponding to full employment. If 
aggregate demand is expanded more rapidly, then demand-side condi 
tions will also take a turn more favorable to young adults. Although the 
outlook is uncertain, it hardly warrants dismissing the possibility of a
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strong labor market for young people that would induce a fertility 
upswing.
Table 4. Swings in Completed Fertility Since Around 1990
Initial trough Peak Projected
Children Children Children
Birth per Birth per Birth per
cohort woman cohort woman cohort woman














































































SOURCE Calot (1988) The Netherlands is omitted because it does not have a swing in fertility. 
Compared with the other countries here, it starts at a much higher initial level (around 3 children 
per woman) and trends downward 
n.a.=not available
Ongoing rates of childbearing, historical fertility experience, and the 
prospective labor demand-supply conditions for young adults thus sug 
gest as a serious possibility a prospective upswing in fertility. If this 
possibility were introduced into projections it would, of course, sub 
stantially alter the outlook for population growth and dependency 
rates. Over the next decade or two, population growth and dependency 
would be higher than now projected as the population under 18 grew 
more rapidly than expected. (No doubt, there would also be a renewed 
upsurge of fears about excessive population growth.) But in the period 
when dependency is currently expected to reach projected highs, after 
2025, there would be a tendency for the dependency ratio to decline as 
the newest baby boom cohorts reached adulthood and expanded the 
numbers in working ages.
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While all of this is conjectural, it is hardly any more so than the pre 
vailing consensus of a continued birth dearth. This consensus rests 
solely on a projection six decades hence of experience merely of the 
last two decades. It is hard to see why projections sixty years down the 
road should not be based on historical experience of at least compara 
ble length. The possibility of a substantial fertility upswing would 
seem to deserve more weight in assessments of population prospects 
than is given to it currently.
Summary
The central question at issue here is whether the demographic pat 
terns projected for the future low or negative population growth and 
population aging are likely to have important adverse effects on 
future economic growth, that is, whether the projected patterns of pop 
ulation growth imply secular stagnation on the economic side. To 
answer this, we have focused particularly on the record of the last cen 
tury.
As it turns out, historical experience raises serious doubt about this 
secular stagnation thesis. In the past, growth rates of real per capita 
income have trended upward despite a downward trend in population 
growth. This is hardly what one would expect if population growth 
were exerting a serious drag on the economy. Also, in the post-World 
War II period, economic growth rates have differed sharply between 
periods with little or no differences in dependency. Nor are projected 
demographic changes markedly out of line with past experience. 
Future declines projected for the rate of population growth are quite 
small; hence it is hard to see why a substantial new negative effect on 
economic growth should emerge. Projections of aging of the labor 
force itself do not yield magnitudes out of line with previous experi 
ence. Moreover, there will be a sharp increase in the educational attain 
ment of older workers. Negative effects, if any, of labor force aging on 
innovation and mobility are likely to be offset by a markedly higher 
educational level of the older population, as well as the greater experi 
ence of older workers.
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Similarly, the outlook for the total dependency burden on workers, 
when viewed in historical perspective, is not unprecedented. Projected 
total dependency rates are, on average, about the same as in the late 
nineteenth century, since rising old-age dependency is projected to be 
offset by declining youth dependency. An assessment of the projected 
change in tax burden per worker suggests that this is not likely to be so 
great as to have serious adverse incentive effects.
Indeed, the longer-term historical record raises doubt about fertility 
leveling off below replacement levels, as currently projected. Com 
pleted fertility in this century shows a long-term swing of about fifty 
years duration, and labor market conditions are now emerging that 
favor a new upswing. In all of the countries considered here ,the cur 
rent total fertility rate is above its 1980s trough, and in a number of 
them the increase is sizable. If a new baby boom were to occur, it 
would change the dependency outlook in a more favorable direction in 
the period after 2025, the period when current projections place the 
dependency burden at its highest. It is hard to understand why the pos 
sibility of a new baby boom is so blandly dismissed in demographic 
projections.
In the literature on less developed countries, recent years have seen 
a growing skepticism that population growth has important adverse 
effects on long-term economic growth (see, e.g., Kelley 1986, 1991; 
U.S. National Research Council 1986). It seems likely that a similar 
fate is in store for the current literature foreseeing dire consequences 
for economic growth in the demographic outlook of developed coun 
tries.
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